## 1NC

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#### **the affirmative’s performance turns black suffering into a spectacle, something to be easily packaged up and consumed by judges as part of a libidinal racialized economy of enjoyment from portrayals of suffering. this performing before the master fixes and naturalizes the conditions of pained embodiment.**

Hartman 97 – ass. prof of english @ UC Berkeley (!)

Saidiya V.- “SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21

As well, we need ask why the site of suffering so readily lends itself to inviting identification. Why is pain the conduit of identification? This question may seem to beg the obvious, given the violent domination and dishonor constitutive of enslavement, the acclaimed transformative capacities of pain in sentimental culture, the prevalence of public displays of suffering inclusive of the pageantry of the trade, the spectacle of punishment, circulating reports of slavery’s horrors, the runaway success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and the passage through the “bloodstained gate,” which was a convention of the slave narrative, all of which contributed to the idea that the feelings and consciousness of the enslaved were most available at this site. However, what I am trying to suggest is that if the scene of beating readily lends itself to an identification with the enslaved, it does so at the risk of fixing and naturalizing this condition of pained embodiment and, in complete defiance of Rankin’s good intention, increases the difficulty of beholding black suffering since the endeavor to bring pain close exploits the spectacle of the body in pain and oddly confirms the spectral character of suffering and the inability to witness the captive’s pain. If, on one hand, pain extends humanity to the dispossessed and the ability to sustain suffering leads to transcendence, on the other, the spectral and spectacular character of this suffering, or, in other words, the shocking and ghostly presence of pain, effaces and restricts black sentience. As Rankin himself states, in order for this suffering to induce a reaction and stir feelings, it must be brought close. Yet if sentiment or morality are “inextricably tied to human proximity,” to quote Zygmunt Bauman, the problem is that in the very effort to “bring it near” and “inspect it closely” it is dissipated. According to Bauman, “morality conforms to the law of optical perspective. It looms large and thick close to the eye.” So, then, how does suffering elude or escape us in the very effort to bring it near? It does so precisely because it can only be brought near by way of a proxy and by way of Rankin’s indignation and imagination. If the black body is the vehicle of the other’s power, pleasure, and profit, then it is no less true that it is the white or near-white body that makes the captive’s suffering visible and discernible. Indeed, the elusiveness of black suffering can be attributed to a racist optics in which black flesh is itself identified as the source of opacity, the denial of black humanity, and the effacement of sentience integral to the wanton use of the captive body. And as noted earlier, this is further complicated by the repressive underside of an optics of morality that insists upon the other as a mirror of the self and that in order to recognize suffering one must substitute the self for the other. While Rankin attempts to ameliorate the insufficiency of feeling before the spectacle of the other’s suffering, this insufficiency is, in fact, displaced rather than remedied by his standing in. Likewise, this attempt exacerbates the distance between the readers and those suffering by literally removing the slave from view as pain is brought close. Moreover, we need to consider whether the identification forged at the site of suffering confirms black humanity at the peril of reinforcing racist assumptions of limited sentience, in that the humanity of the enslaved and the violence of the institution can only be brought into view by extreme examples of incineration and dismemberment or by placing white bodies at risk. What does it mean that the violence of slavery or pained existence of the enslaved, if discernible, is only so in the most heinous and grotesque examples and not in the quotidian routines of slavery? As well, is not the difficulty of empathy related to both the devaluation and the valuation of black life? Empathic identification is complicated further by the fact that it cannot be extricated from the economy of chattel slavery with which it is at odds, for this projection of one’s feeling upon or into the object of property and the phantasmic slipping into captivity, while it is distinct from the pleasures of self-augmentation yielded by the ownership of the captive body and the expectations fostered therein, is nonetheless entangled with this economy and identification facilitated by a kindred possession or occupation of the captive body, albeit on a different register. In other words, what I am trying to isolate are the kinds of expectations and the qualities of affect distinctive to the economy of slavery. The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, can be explained in part by the fungibility of the slave-that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. Put differently, the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion. Thus, while the beaten and mutilated body presumably establishes the brute materiality of existence, the materiality of suffering regularly eludes (re)cognition by virtue of the body’s being replaced by other signs of value, as well as other bodies. Thus the desire to don, occupy, or possess blackness or the black body as a sentimental resource and/or locus of excess enjoyment is both founded upon and enabled by the material relations of chattel slavery. In light of this, is it too extreme or too obvious to suggest that Rankin’s flight of imagination and the excitements engendered by suffering might also be pleasurable? Certainly this willing abasement confirms Rankin’s moral authority, but what about the pleasure engendered by this embrace of pain-that is the tumultuous passions of the flightly imagination stirred by this fantasy of being beaten? Rankin’s imagined beating is immune neither to the pleasures to be derived from the masochistic fantasy nor to the sadistic pleasure to be derived from the spectacle of sufferance. Here my intention is not to shock or exploit the perverse but to consider critically the complicated nexus of terror and enjoyment by examining the obviated and debased diversions of the capricious master; the pleasure of indignation yielded before the spectacle of sufferance; the instability of the scene of suffering; and the confusion of song and sorrow typical of the coffle, the auction block, performing before the master, and other popular amusements.

#### **this politics of naming pain generates portraits of abuse that lock in an exploitative system where one only earns recognition from judges when the body is portrayed as violated. recognition becomes predicated on the displaying of abjection and pain. in order to gain the ballot, the curious, intrigued judge requests that you show your scars.**

Tuck & Yang 14 – prof of nat am studies @ suny & prof of ethnic studies @ cal

(E. & K., R-words: Refusing research)

The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars (Hartman, 1997, 2007; Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya Hartman (1997) discusses how recognizing the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slave- owning class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human (Hartman, 2007). In response, new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury” (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” (p. 55). Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. “[T]he recognition of humanity require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person” (p. 55). Furthermore, Hartman describes how slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how the agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. Hartman asks, “Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of subjugation and pained existence?” (p. 55).

#### **far from wanting to silence their performance, the debate community is waiting to watch it with bated breath. white settler colonialism has always thought that scars make your body more interesting, that pain is more compelling than privilege, and that struggling hard in life makes you “real” and “authentic.” academics perversely fetishize suffering vicariously. they will never experience it, but love to valorize it. judges happily gobble up this easily-consumable narrative of black suffering and dysfunction. this feeds the colonialism inherent in the academy.**

Tuck & Yang 14 – prof of nat am studies @ suny & prof of ethnic studies @ cal

(E. & K., R-words: Refusing research)

We are struck by the pervasive silence on questions regarding the contemporary rationale(s) for social science research. Though a variety of ethical and procedural protocols require researchers to compose statements regarding the objectives or purposes of a particular project, such protocols do not prompt reflection upon the underlying beliefs about knowledge and change that too often go unexplored or unacknowledged. The rationale for conducting social science research that collects pain narratives seems to be self-evident for many scholars, but when looked at more closely, the rationales may be unconsidered, and somewhat flimsy. Like a maritime archaeological site, such rationales might be best examined in situ, for fear of deterioration if extracted. Why do researchers collect pain narratives? Why does the academy want them?¶ An initial and partial answer is because settler colonial ideology believes that, in fiction author Sherril Jaffe’s words, “scars make your body more interesting,” (1996, p. 58). Jaffe’s work of short, short of fiction bearing that sentiment as title captures the exquisite crossing of wounds and curiosity and pleasure. Settler colonial ideology, constituted by its conscription of others, holds the wounded body as more engrossing than the body that is not wounded (though the person with a wounded body does not politically or materially benefit for being more engrossing). In settler colonial logic, pain is more compelling than privilege, scars more enthralling than the body unmarked by experience. In settler colonial ideology, pain is evidence of authenticity, of the verifiability of a lived life. Academe, formed and informed by settler colonial ideology, has developed the same palate for pain. Emerging and established social science researchers set out to document the problems faced by communities, and often in doing so, recirculate common tropes of dysfunction, abuse, and neglect.

#### whether they know it or not, the aff is performing to satisfy white subconscious fantasies of black abjection – this puts white people at a comfortable distance from suffering and satisfies their hidden desire to see blacks in pain

Hook 13 – prof @ birkbeck college, university of london

(Derek, The racist bodily imaginary: The image of the body-in-pieces in (post)apartheid culture, *Subjectivity* Vol. 6, No. 3, 254–271)

One of the great strengths of Fanon’s (1952/1986) Black Skin White Masks lies precisely in its apparent exaggerations, which show how adept the young Fanon was, amidst his early enthusiasm for psychoanalysis, in reading white fantasy. Fanon uses the imagery of the black body being broken apart, burnt, cut, exploded, eviscerated, describing such scenes with the notion of ‘corporeal malediction’.3 He was obviously deeply affected by accounts of lynching and related forms of physical racist violence, but his disturbingly eloquent descriptions, articulated in the vocabulary of phenomenology and psychoanalysis, go further than this. He taps into the just ‘beneath the surface’ imaginary quality of racist fantasy. Fantasy of this sort is not readily assumed or ‘owned’ by the subject. It is not openly spoken of, or effectively ‘subjectivized’; quite the contrary, the experiencing subject might be surprised, even repelled by the fantasy if it is rendered too clearly, in overly explicit forms. Nor for that matter is the fantasy wholly unconscious; it is more like a latent schema of understanding, a subliminal frame of apprehension through which black otherness comes to be understood.¶ Fanon (1952/1986) is also profoundly aware of the idealizing aspect of such fantasies. These idealizations are entwined with stereotyping caricatures, so that apparently admirable qualities become reduced to racial vices: the perception of economic industriousness is thus transformed into ‘the Jew’s love of money’ (for detailed elaboration of Fanon’s argument, see Hook, 2011). What this postulate brings to light is the possibility that the (post)apartheid preoccupation with the black body-in-pieces maintains a ‘co-representative’, an additional fantasmatic component. I have in mind here the notion of the black body as strong, impervious, possessed of a formidable and superior physicality. This stereotypical trait, which might be recognized variously in irrational attributions of athleticism, bodily strength, vitality and natural physical endowment, is of course a well-known trope of racism also in British and US contexts (St Louis, 2005; Stuart, 2005). The black body here becomes – perhaps unexpectedly – ‘phallic’: an emblem of strength, of power, of what the white subject has lost, or stands to lose.¶ Our tentative analysis thus points to a twofold schema, an antinomy of fantasy. On the one hand: the phallic corporeality of black corporeality, the black body as epitome of physicality, as icon of vitality, as body in apotheosis. Yet, in contrast to such (distorted) idealizations, these bodies remain in perpetual proximity to death, to suffering; they are pictured in terrible states of duress, of dismemberment and violence that the white subject can never quite imagine for themselves. The fantasmatic black body exists thus in two irreconcilable scenes: as site of destruction (the body-in-pieces), and as image of physical perfection, bodily exultation, site of exaggerated vitality. Body in extremis coincides thus with the body in excelsis.¶ Such a complex of coinciding images makes for fertile terrain within the racist (or racialized) imaginary, and affords a variety of dynamic explanations. One may understand the alternating components of this complex, this racist ‘archetype’, along the lines suggested by Mbembe’s (2001) discussion of the body of the colonized, in which an exaggerated physicality eradicates properties of agency, spiritual elevation and humanity:¶ [I]n the colony the body of the colonized individual is considered, in its profanity, one object among others. Indeed, being no more than a ‘body- thing’, it is neither the substrate nor the affirmation of any mind or spirit ... His cadaver remains lying on the earth in a sort of unshakable rigidity, a material mass and a simple, inert object, condemned in the position of that which plays no role at all. (Mbembe, 2001, pp. 26–27)¶ What is particularly useful about Mbembe’s contribution is that it links many of the above psychoanalytic theorizations of the body to a more overtly political dimension, that of key notions within the philosophy of colonial subjugation.4 These ideas link back to a longstanding Fanonian theme: the delegation of the bodily. This is the idea that the crass corporeality of the body that a particular (racial/class) group disavows is projected upon another group, who is thus consigned to the position of abject racial other.¶ Fanon’s concern is primarily with white attributions of the hyper-sexuality of blacks, but we may extrapolate his idea to include the facet of excess corporeality, the dimension of the abject body. The factor of racialization here is impossible to ignore: the broken body, the suffering body, the repulsive body-in- pieces is always, certainly within apartheid culture, the black body. We can go one step further and link this conceptualization to Lacan’s (2006) formulations regarding the corps morcelé. In his seminal essay on the mirror-stage, Lacan notes that the ‘fragmented body ... is regularly manifested in dreams’, particularly so under experiences of ‘the aggressive disintegration of the individual’ (p. 78). Of course, given the predominance of the social fantasy with which we are concerned here, it is apparent that such schemas of fragmentation are not equally distributed throughout all social groups. One would expect, in situations of radical social asymmetry, that such imagery would be delegated to racial/cultural/ class others who are then given the burden of acting as depository for all such values and all related anxieties of fragmentation. This would be to say that the white body-in-pieces in racist or (post)colonial culture is elided; it never comes into view; it is never present except in the displaced form of the abjected black body-in-pieces.¶ On the basis of the above theorizations we can offer at least two accounts of the dynamic relationship between the facets of the fantasy we are examining. Doing so enables us to speculate on the libidinal economy, that is, the distribution of affects, in these related scenes. We might begin by emphasizing the priority placed on the imagining of the black body-in-pieces in racist contexts, and stress the need for white subjects to revisit or visualize this image precisely as the displacement of the fragmentary experiences of the white body-in-pieces. Odd as it may sound, such images here would have a placatory function, soothing anxieties of dissolution by locating them in a site of pronounced dis-identifica- tion. A societal fixation with such images, their incessant repetition within various forms of popular culture, can thus be understood along affective lines: such images glow with the gratification of respite, with the alleviation of anxiety, they make a tacit pronouncement: ‘White bodies are not destined for this fate’.¶ There is also an argument that such scenes visit upon their victims exactly the violence they are thought to deserve. One relies here on the notion of projection, the idea that the other comes to be the carrier of the repellant values that the racist subject has themselves discarded. One thus attacks the other, blames them, with vigour proportionate to the need to expel these attributes from the self. To this we may add the Lacanian thesis that such depictions play the part of a scene of (dis) identification. Lacan’s (2006) notion of the mirror stage specified that a double relation obtained between the subject and potential image of identification: the image is both jubilantly loved as a narcissistically gratifying object, and yet also hated inasmuch as it proves a destabilizing or rivalrous influence. Such images of black body-in-pieces are, as such, a pure imagining of hate. There is a wishfulness about them, as if they visualize a desire, perhaps like the picturing of a wish in a dream, albeit in a literal and unusually undisguised manner.

#### our alternative is a politics of refusal that refuses the affirmative in favor of desire-centered research.

#### Our alternative has several components

#### First, the politics of refusal –

#### Refusal is not just a “no,” it is a redirection. Our alternative is perhaps best described by Ken Gonzalez-Day’s *Erased Lynchings* Series, in which he edits photographs of lynchings and removes the lynch victim from the tree. it is clear to any observer that a murder has taken place, but his work refuses to display the spectacle of suffering to the gaze of the audience. refusal is an active choice to remove the depiction of the body from the site of bodily violence. this redirects our attention and research efforts to the violating instruments, not the violated body. this adequately portrays and represents suffering in a way such that we can study it and work against it, but it refuses to satisfy the fascination with suffering, it refuses to satiate the morbid curiosity of the spectator, it refuses to play by the representational rules of White settler colonialism, and it de-spectaclizes suffering.

Tuck & Yang 14 – prof of nat am studies @ suny & prof of ethnic studies @ cal

(E. & K., R-words: Refusing research)

For the purposes of our discussion, the most important insight to draw from Simpson’s article is her emphasis that refusals are not subtractive, but are theoretically generative (p. 78), expansive. Refusal is not just a “no,” but a redirection to ideas otherwise unacknowledged or unquestioned. Unlike a settler colonial configuration of knowledge that is petulantly exasperated and resentful of limits, a methodology of refusal regards limits on knowledge as productive, as indeed a good thing. ¶ To explore how refusal and the installation of limits on settler colonial knowledge might be productive, we make a brief detour to the Erased Lynching series (2002–2011) by Los Angeles–based artist Ken Gonzales-Day (see Figure 12.1). Gonzales-Day researched lynching in California and the Southwest and found that the majority of lynch victims were Latinos, American Indians, and Asians. Like lynchings in the South, lynchings in California were events of public spectacle, often attended by hundreds, sometimes thousands of festive onlookers. At the lynchings, professional photographers took hours to set up portable studios similar to those used at carnivals; they sold their images frequently as postcards, mementos of public torture and execution to be circulated by U.S. post through- out the nation and the world. Lynching, we must be reminded, was extralegal, yet nearly always required the complicity of law enforcement—either by marshals or sheriffs in the act itself, or by judges and courts in not bothering to prosecute the lynch mob afterward. The photographs immortalize the murder beyond the time and place of the lynching, and in their proliferation, expand a single murder to the general murderability of the non-White body. In this respect, the image of the hanged, mutilated body itself serves a critical function in the maintenance of White supremacy and the spread of racial terror beyond the lynching. The spectacle of the lynching is the medium of terror.¶ Gonzales-Day’s Erased Lynching series reintroduces the photographs of lynching to a contemporary audience, with one critical intervention: The ropes and the lynch victim have been removed from the images. Per Gonzales-Day’s website (n.d.), the series enacted a conceptual gesture intended to direct the viewer’s attention, not upon the lifeless body of the lynch victim, but upon the mechanisms of lynching themselves: the crowd, the spectacle, the photographer, and even consider the impact of flash photography upon this dismal past. The perpetrators, if present, remain fully visible, jeering, laughing, or pulling at the air in a deadly pantomime. As such, this series strives to make the invisible visible.¶ The Erased Lynching series yields another context in which we might consider what a social scientist’s refusal stance might comprise. Though indeed centering on the erasure of the former object, refusal need not be thought of as a subtractive methodology. Refusal prompts analysis of the festive spectators regularly backgrounded in favor of wounded bodies, strange fruit, interesting scars. Refusal shifts the gaze from the violated body to the violating instruments—in this case, the lynch mob, which does not disappear when the lynching is over, but continues to live, accumulating land and wealth through the extermination and subordination of the Other. Thus, refusal helps move us from thinking of violence as an event and toward an analysis of it as a structure.¶ Gonzales-Day might have decided to reproduce and redistribute the images as postcards, which, by way of showing up in mundane spaces, might have effectively inspired reflection on the spectacle of violence and media of terror. However, in removing the body and the ropes, he installed limits on what the audience can access, and redirected our gaze to the bodies of those who were there to see a murder take place, and to the empty space beneath the branches. Gonzales-Day introduced a new representational territory, one that refuses to play by the rules of the settler colonial gaze, and one that refuses to satisfy the morbid curiosity derived from settler colonialism’s preoccupation with pain.¶ Refusals are needed for narratives and images arising in social science research that rehumiliate when circulated, but also when, in Simpson’s words, “the representation would bite all of us and compromise the representational territory that we have gained for ourselves in the past 100 years” (p. 78). As researcher-narrator, Simpson tells us, “I reached my own limit when the data would not contribute to our sovereignty or complicate the deeply simplified, atrophied representations of Iroquois and other Indigenous peoples that they have been mired within anthropologically” (p. 78). Here Simpson makes clear the ways in which research is not the intervention that is needed—that is, the inter- ventions of furthering sovereignty or countering misrepresentations of Native people as anthropological objects.¶ Considering Erased Lynchings dialogically with On Ethnographic Refusal, we can see how refusal is not a prohibition but a generative form. First, refusal turns the gaze back upon power, specifically the colonial modalities of knowing per- sons as bodies to be differentially counted, violated, saved, and put to work. It makes transparent the metanarrative of knowledge production—its spectatorship for pain and its preoccupation for documenting and ruling over racial difference. Thus, refusal to be made meaningful first and foremost is grounded in a critique of settler colonialism, its construction of Whiteness, and its regimes of representation. Second, refusal generates, expands, champions representational territories that colonial knowledge endeavors to settle, enclose, domesticate. Simpson com- plicates the portrayals of Iroquois, without resorting to reportrayals of anthropo- logical Indians. Gonzales-Day portrays the violations without reportraying the victimizations. Third, refusal is a critical intervention into research and its circu- lar self-defining ethics. The ethical justification for research is defensive and self-encircling—its apparent self-criticism serves to expand its own rights to know, and to defend its violations in the name of “good science.” Refusal challenges the individualizing discourse of IRB consent and “good science” by high- lighting the problems of collective harm, of representational harm, and of knowledge colonization. Fourth, refusal itself could be developed into both method and theory. Simpson presents refusal on the part of the researcher as a type of calculus ethnography. Gonzales-Day deploys refusal as a mode of representation. Simpson theorizes refusal by the Kahnawake Nation as anticolonial, and rooted in the desire for possibilities outside of colonial logics, not as a reactive stance. This final point about refusal connects our conversation back to desire as a counterlogic to settler colonial knowledge.

#### **a politics of refusal restricts what academics are allowed to have access to, marks some things as off limits, as not up for discussion. there are some types of knowledge that the academy does not deserve. the affirmative gives the colonial academy the right to know, and thus the right to conquer**

Tuck & Yang 14 – prof of nat am studies @ suny & prof of ethnic studies @ cal

(E. & K., R-words: Refusing research)

Under coloniality, Descartes’ formulation, cognito ergo sum (“I think, therefore I am”) transforms into ego conquiro (“I conquer, therefore I am”; Dussel, 1985; Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Ndlvou-Gatsheni, 2011). Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2009) expounds on this relationship of the conqueror’s sense-of-self to his knowledge-of-others (“I know her, therefore I am me”). Knowledge of self/Others became the philosophical justification for the acquisition of bodies and territories, and the rule over them. Thus the right to conquer is intimately connected to the right to know (“I know, therefore I conquer, therefore I am”). Maldonado- Torres (2009) explains that for Levi Strauss, the self/Other knowledge paradigm is the methodological rule for the birth of ethnology as a science (pp. 3–4). Settler colonial knowledge is premised on frontiers; conquest, then, is an exercise of the felt entitlement to transgress these limits. Refusal, and stances of refusal in research, are attempts to place limits on conquest and the colonization of knowledge by marking what is off limits, what is not up for grabs or discussion, what is sacred, and what can’t be known. To speak of limits in such a way makes some liberal thinkers uncomfortable, and may, to them, seem dangerous. When access to information, to knowledge, to the intellectual commons is controlled by the people who generate that information [participants in a research study], it can be seen as a violation of shared standards of justice and truth. (Simpson, 2007, p. 74)

#### these two parts of our alternative are connected. desire is a mode for refusal, a counterlogic to the gaze that wants to see damaged, pained bodies. our alternative flips the script on the academy by forcing it to study itself, by making the spectator into a spectacle to be considered critically. it provides a method that can solve the case, but avoid our disadvantages.

Tuck & Yang 14 – prof of nat am studies @ suny & prof of ethnic studies @ cal

(E. & K., R-words: Refusing research)

One way to think about refusal is how desire can be a framework, mode, and space for refusal. As a framework, desire is a counterlogic to the logics of settler colonialism. Rooted in possibilities gone but not foreclosed, “the not yet, and at times, the not anymore” (Tuck, 2010, p. 417), desire refuses the master narrative that colonization was inevitable and has a monopoly on the future. By refusing the teleos of colonial future, desire expands possible futures. As a mode of refusal, desire is a “no” and a “yes.”¶ Another way to think about refusal is to consider using strategies of social science research to further expose the complicity of social science disciplines and research in the project of settler colonialism. There is much need to employ social science to turn back upon itself as settler colonial knowledge, as opposed to universal, liberal, or neutral knowledge without horizon. This form of refusal might include bringing attention to the mechanisms of knowledge legitimation, like the Good Labkeeping Seal of Approval (discussed under Axiom III); contesting appropriation, like the collection of pain narratives; and publicly renouncing the diminishing of Indigenous or local narratives with blood narratives in the name of science, such as in the Havasupai case discussed under Axiom II.¶ As long as the objects of research are presumably damaged communities in need of intervention, the metanarrative of social science research remains unchallenged: which is that research at worst is simply an expansion of common knowledge (and therefore harmless), and that research at best is problem solving (and therefore beneficial). This metanarrative justifies a host of interventions into communities, and treats communities as frontiers to civilize, regardless of the specific conclusions of individual research projects. Consider, for example, well- intended research on achievement gaps that fuels NCLB and testing; the documentation of youth violence that provides the rationales for gang injunctions and the expansion of the prison industrial complex; the documentation of diabetes as justification for unauthorized genomic studies and the expansion of anti- Indigenous theories. Instead, by making the settler colonial metanarrative the object of social science research, researchers may bring to a halt or at least slow down the machinery that allows knowledge to facilitate interdictions on Indigenous and Black life. Thus, this form of refusal might also involve tracking the relationships between social science research and expansions of state and corporate violence against communities. Social science researchers might design their work to call attention to or interrogate power, rather than allowing their work to serve as yet another advertisement for power. Further, this form of refusal might aim to leverage the resources of the academy to expand the representational territories fought for by communities working to thwart settler colonialism.¶ We close this chapter with much left unsaid. This is both because there is so much to say, and also because, as we have noted, all refusal is particular. Refusal understands the wisdom in a story, as well as the wisdom in not passing that story on. Refusal in research makes way for other r-words—for resistance, reclaiming, recovery, reciprocity, repatriation, regeneration. Though understandings of refusal are still emergent, though so much is still coming into view, we want to consolidate a summary of take-away points for our readers. A parting gift, of sorts, as each of us takes our leave to map our next steps as researchers, as com- munity members, within and without academe. We think of this list as a tear-away sheet, something to cut out and carry in your pocket, sew into a prayer flag, or paste into your field notebooks.¶ x Refusal can be a generative stance for humanized researchers.¶ x Refusal is not just a “no.”¶ x Refusal must be situated in a critical understanding of settler colonialism and its regimes of representation (i.e., the disappearance of Indigenous people, the enslavability and murderability of Black people, the right to make interdictions on Othered lives).¶ x Refusal makes space for desire and other representational territories, such as making the spectator the spectacle, and turning settler colonial knowledge back on itself.¶ x Refusal is multidimensional, in dynamic relationship between communities who refuse, the researched who refuse, and the researcher who refuses—or who do not.¶ x Social science knowledge is settler colonial knowledge. It also refuses (refuses the agency, personhood, and theories of the researched), and it also set limits (limits the epistemologies of the colonized/colonizable/to-be-colonized) and hides its own refusals and limits in order to appear limitless.¶ x Thus, refusal makes visible the processes of settler colonial knowledge. Refusal, by its very existence and exercise, sets limits on settler colonial knowledge.¶ x Similarly, refusal denudes power (and power-knowledge) without becoming an advertisement for power.¶ x Refusal problematizes hidden or implicit theories of change.¶ x Most efficacious might be the refusal by the researcher, how she determines the limits on what she can ask or what she will write. This refusal might take the form of: turning off the tape recorder; not disclosing what was on the tape even if it was recorded; hearing a story and choosing to listen and learn from it rather than report it; resisting the draw to traffic theories that cast communities as in need of salvation.

## 2NC

### 2nc uq

#### **there is no uniqueness to the affirmative – the onus is on them to prove why this representation of suffering will do something that the flood of other representations haven’t done**

Tuck 9 – prof @ SUNY

(Eve, Suspending Damage)

I want to recognize that, particularly in Native communities, there was a need for research that exposed the uninhabitable, inhumane conditions in which people lived and continue to live. My ability to articulate this critique is due to the lessons and accomplishments that have been made on the backs of prior generations of communities and researchers. I have boundless respect for the elders who paved the way for respectful, mutually beneficial research in Indigenous communities. I appreciate that, in many ways, there was a time and place for damage-centered research. However, in talking with some of these elders, they agree that a time for a shift has come

, that damage-centered narratives are no longer sufficient. We are in a new historical moment—so much so that even Margaret Mead probably would not do research like Margaret Mead these days.1

### 2nc link threshold

#### **any risk of a link demands a neg ballot – if you think that you can “reasonably” parse out the valuable parts of the aff to sever our links and still vote for them, you’re wrong. cognitive neuroscience proves that depictions of suffering trigger affective gut responses of disgust and fear that influence our thoughts and actions. all of our thoughts and opinions stem from this affective register, and depictions of suffering lodge themselves squarely into the subconscious of the judges.**

Livingston 12 – Assistant prof of Government @ Cornell, post-doctoral fellow in the department of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins University, doctoral fellow at the Centre for Ethics at the University of Toronto (Alexander, Avoiding Deliberative Democracy? Micropolitics, Manipulation, and the Public Sphere, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2012), pp. 269-294, Project MUSE)

Intellectualism and the Visceral Register The first step in exploring the potential of William Connolly’s reluctant theory of deliberative democracy is to come to terms with the reasons why he thinks extant accounts of communicative politics are insufficient. Intellectualism, Connolly argues, is the grand failing of deliberative democracy. In accusing deliberative democracy of intellectualism, he is not issuing a by-now familiar criticism of deliberative rationalism. To say that deliberative democracy is guilty of intellectualism is not to say that it is blind to questions of power, or identity, or difference—or at least it’s not only to say this—but rather that deliberative models of democracy are working with a faulty conception of thinking. They have been captured by what Gilles Deleuze calls “the image of thought”—the idea that thinking is an autonomous, linguistically mediated process of mind that is oriented toward coherence and truth (1994, 129–67). Deliberative thinking takes place at one relatively transparent register where our reasons for action can be compared, reasoned about, and revised through the force of the better argument. This image of thought is intellectualist because it fails to see how thought is a layered process of neural, perceptual, and embodied activity not reducible to conceptual ratiocination alone. “Attempts to give priority to the highest and conceptually most sophisticated brain nodules in thinking and judgment,” Connolly argues, “may encourage those invested in these theories to underestimate the importance of body image, unconscious motor memory, and thought-imbued affect” (2002, 10). Against the intellectualist image of thought, Connolly argues that thinking is distributed across multiple registers that make possible “visceral modes of appraisal” (1999, 27). It is these deep, intensive, and reactive visceral modes of thinking and judgment that the deliberative image of thinking overlooks. Disgust, for example, is a visceral response that makes your stomach turn. It seems to well up inside you without your willing it. The values and beliefs of others can sometimes stimulate this kind of feeling, say, if they present you with a defense of cloning, or euthanasia, or gay marriage, as the case may be. You can’t always put your finger on what it is that strikes you as so disgusting and morally contaminating about such proposals, but sometimes you just feel that they are plain wrong. We’re unable to provide defensible reasons for our responses. Sometimes things just rub us the wrong way. Connolly’s point is that visceral and embodied responses like disgust, shame, and hatred come to play a role in political decision making—as they evidently do in political deliberations about matters such as cloning, euthanasia, and gay marriage—and that a deliberative approach is poorly equipped to deal with them. Deliberative democrats either require that these sorts of affective feelings are purged from the public sphere as unfortunate distortions of real communication, or they suggest that they can be subject to deliberation and argument just as any other sort of belief, interest, or prejudice can be. Connolly thinks that both of these approaches are bound to fail. Visceral reactions are not conceptually sophisticated thoughts and as such are not amenable to deliberation, argumentation, or verbal persuasion. The exchange of validity claims alone is not enough to stop your stomach from churning when you think about the right to die. Deliberative democrats need to learn “how much more there is to thinking than argument” and to begin experimenting with alternative forms of political engagement (1999, 149). Because political judgment is so often carried out at the level of this visceral or virtual register, deliberation cannot provide a privileged or efficacious form of participation, justification, or transformation. To corroborate these claims about the multiple registers of thinking, Connolly turns to recent findings in neuroscience that suggest a more intimate relationship between reason, the emotions, and the body than [End Page 272] the intellectualist account assumes. Like some other political theorists, Connolly hopes that a closer engagement with neurology and cognitive science will provide grounds for a more adequate account of subjectivity, reason, and ethics.3 The kind of thinking that intellectualists privilege—sophisticated, conceptual, reflective, deliberative, and linguistically mediatedthought—pertains to the activity of the largest part of the brain, the cerebral cortex. It is through the rich and complex layers of neural activity in the cortex that we can perform intricate activities like planning, speaking, reasoning, and arguing. What recent findings in neuroscience suggest, however, is that cortical activity is not autonomous and is in fact in some ways subservient to the parts of the brain that control emotions, memory, and affect.4 In particular, the cortex responds to information from the limbic system, the small curved part of the brain below the cortex that controls emotion and fine motor movement. Made up of the basal ganglia, the hippo-campus, and the amygdala, the limbic system enables the fast, intensive, and reactive action of affects. The jolt of fear that makes one’s hair stand on end or the disgust that we feel in the pit of our stomachs is the work of the part of the limbic system called the amygdala. The sort of reactions governed by this system are an evolutionary necessity for a species that needs to appraise and respond to dangerous situations quickly and effectively without much cognitive expenditure. The decision to jump out of the way of a speeding car needs to happen in a split second. It is not the sort of situation that allows you to deliberate about the relative merits of your different options before acting. But this is not to say that the limbic system is entirely thoughtless. It is not concerned with sophisticated, conceptual, and deliberative thinking, but its actions certainly are symbolically mediated or “thought imbued” in some sense (the expression is Connolly’s). These intense affective responses are not entirely biologically determined but instead take a fair deal of cultural learning. The limbic system in a sense learns or records cultural standards of what is dangerous and what is disgusting and then habituates them as automated response.5 Between the cortex and limbic system there is a “feedback loop” of mutual influence through which these fast, affective, “proto-thoughts” of the limbic system shape the slow, reflective thinking of the cortex (2002). The existence of these intensive, instinctive elements moving below the register of reflective judgment means that human reason is not pure and autonomous but rather is shaped in a complex way at the neural level by the influence of the emotions and affects.6 David Hume, it would seem, [End Page 273] was right to say that reason is in fact the slave of the passions. And what this means for politics is that the emotions and affects that shape and guide thinking are themselves deeply influenced by values and opinions that we may or may not actually want to endorse. Racist, sexist, homophobic, and other ideological sentiments may lodge themselves deeply into this “body-brain-culture network” (2002). Where this is the case, valid and sound argumentation is at a loss to dislodge them and the force of the better argument may be powerless to persuade us to respect, tolerate, or trust each other in the ways that democratic cooperation require. Connolly explains: Culturally preorganized charges shape perception and judgment in ways that exceed the picture of the world supported by the models of calculative reason, intersubjective culture, and deliberative democracy. They show us how linguistically complex brain regions respond not only to events in the world but also, proprioceptively, to cultural habits, skills, memory traces, and affects mixed into our muscles, skin, gut, and cruder brain regions. (2002, 36) This all culminates in a critique of deliberative models of democracy: the inability of practical reason to influence these potentially dangerous or hateful “culturally preorganized charges” points to its undoing.

#### **our author explicitly says we need a full moratorium on damage narratives – a politics of refusal does not include compromise**

Tuck 9 – prof @ SUNY

(Eve, Suspending Damage)

To forward our survivance, to deepen our sovereignty, I believe it is time for a moratorium on damage-centered research in our communities. This moratorium will put a freeze on damage-centered research efforts while stakeholders in our communities take some time to reflect on the positive and negative outcomes of past damage-centered research on our peoples; to create and implement guidelines for researchers working in our communities; and to (re)con- sider the roles of research in our communities. I believe that a moratorium on damage-centered research in our communities could give us the time to accomplish three goals:¶ Re-vision our theories of change. The first goal for a proposed moratorium is to re-vision and firm up our theory(ies) of change and to determine what role, if any, research has in making our dreams come true for our communities. It is important to ask, when considering a new community research project, “What can research really do to improve this situation?” The answers might reveal that research can do little in a particular situation or quite a lot in another. Or they may reveal that it is not the research that will make the difference but, rather, who participates in the research, who poses the questions, how data are gathered, and who conducts the analysis. This is a call to not take theories of change for granted, but to be sure that our actions make steps toward our purposes.¶ Establish tribal and community human research ethics guidelines. Another goal of the proposed moratorium is to learn from and build on the work happening in tribes and communities all over the globe to establish tribal or community human research ethics guidelines and to develop and strengthen the commit- tees or other structures to maintain these guidelines. Communities might also consider guidelines that protect cultural, intellectual, and sacred knowledges from being stolen, appropriated, or handled in ways that are disrespectful. Further, communities might consider guidelines that are extended to land, flora, and fauna that hold meanings unobserved by the “whitestream” academy (Battiste, 2008; see also appendix A). The work to establish and enforce ethical guidelines and conditions in research on tribes and urban communities has been under way for more than a decade, but the guidelines do not usually address the framing of the research. Communities might consider establish- ing guidelines that insist on frameworks of desire and work with researchers to reframe damage-centered projects as desire-based inquiries.¶ Create mutually beneficial roles for academic researchers in community research.¶ A third goal of the proposed moratorium could be to reassess the role of the academy in community research—to consider, in Orlando Fals-Borda and Ansuir Rahman’s (1991) words, “breaking the monopoly” the academy has on research and community self-knowledge. In many ways, this is a call for a remembrance of the true purpose of knowledge in/for our communities. Through this (re)consideration, tribes and communities might decide that there is no role, or a diminished role, for academic researchers in certain kinds of inquiry projects and a larger (even a leadership) role for academic researchers in other kinds of studies. Regardless of the size of the role, relationships among the academy and tribes and communities should be mutually beneficial, with an emphasis on the real, positive outcomes for communities in both the short and long term.¶ For some, a moratorium may signal an end or a sense of ﬁnality. To me, a moratorium b for what Indigenous scholar Taiaiake Alfred (2005) calls regeneration, “the direct application of acting against our ingrained and oppressive fears” (p. 151). It is simultaneously an acknowledgment of historic pain and taking action against that pain in order to reframe that history. This duality is represented by the Raven—to some the Raven is a fearsome signal of mortality, but to many Indigenous peoples Raven is the embodiment of curiosity and the full picture of truth. As Alfred (2005) elaborates: We will self-consciously recreate our cultural practices and reform our political identities by drawing on tradition in a thoughtful process of reconstruction and a committed reorganization of our lives in a personal and collective sense. This will result in a new conception of what it is to live as Onkwehonwe [original people]. (p. 34) Alfred’s work ties regeneration to integrity, to recapturing, recommitting to a life, to lives, walked in integrity. I think of the thousands who turned their backs on the remarks of the Australian opposition leader—theirs was a step along a path of integrity. This moratorium—a turning of our own backs on narratives that insist that we are ruined, that we are broken, that we are damaged—is a step, too. Dear readers, I hold that in these ways we can carve out the future legacy of our relationships to research.

## 1NR

### Phelan

#### increasing visibility of marginalized groups only creates a screen for hegemonic bodies to project their desires upon – representation is on the side of the one who looks, not the one who is looked at – our arguments about the gaze should come first and only the alt challenges the substitutional economy of visual representations of suffering

Peggy Phelan 96, chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies, Unmarked: the politics of performance, 26-7

Representation is almost always on the side of the one who looks and almost never on the side of the one who is seen. As feminist film theorists have demonstrated, the fetishized image of the female star serves as a deeply revealing screen for the construction of men’s desire. The image of the woman displays not the subjectivity of the woman who is seen, but rather the constituent forces of desire of the man who wants to see her. 38 Visibility and invisibility are crucially bound; invisibility polices visibility and in this specific sense functions as the ascendant term in the binary. Gaining visibility for the politically under-represented without scrutinizing the power of who is required to display what to whom is an impoverished political agenda. Within the psychic and aesthetic economy of the Western gaze, the visible image of the other necessarily becomes a cipher for the looking self. To overturn these economies the failure of the inward gaze to produce self-seeing needs to be acknowledged. If one could confront the internal/external other as always already lost one would not have to rely so heavily on the image of the external other to produce what the looker lacks. This suggestion is not a refusal of multicultural diversity or of a more inclusive representational landscape. It is rather a way to isolate the impotency of the inward gaze as a fundamental aspect of representational economies. Breaks in the reciprocity of visual exchange offer opportunities to disrupt the neat substitutions of the psychic economy of seeing. Until the image of the other can be other-than a cipher for a looking self, calling for greater visibility of the under-represented will do nothing to improve the quality of our political or psychic imaginations.